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STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
The fo llowing amici submit thi s brief, wi th the 
consent of the parties, 1 in support of Respondent 's argument 
that the Third Circuit properl y held that a constructi ve 
1 Petitioner and Respondent fi led a j oint consent to the fi ling of amici 
briefs with the Clerk of thi s CourL Counsel for amicus curiae authored 
thi s brief in its entirety. No person or entity, other than the amicus 
curiae, its members, or its counsel, made a monetary contributi on to the 
preparati on or submission of the brief. 
2 
di scharge is a tangible emp loyment ac ti on. Suders v. Easton, 
325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003). 
Thi s case , in volving the questi on of whether a 
constructive discharge caused by a supervi sor 's 
di scrimination is a tangible employment action, is a matter of 
signifi cant concern to the Lawyers ' Committee fo r Civil 
Rights Under Law and the organi zati ons joi ning thi s amici 
brief. Thi s case could determine whether the long-
established doc trine of constructi ve di scharge will 
effec tively pro tect vic ti ms of harassment under Title VII of 
? 
the C ivil Ri ghts Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. - The 
Court's decision here will directly affec t the rights of 
employees who are fo rced out of employment on the basis of 
race, sex, reli gion, nat ional origin , or ethni city. As such, thi s 
case directly impacts the constituencies served by the 
undersigned organi zations. 
T he Lawyers' Committee for C ivil Ri ghts Under Law 
("Lawyers ' Committee") is a tax-exempt, nonprofit civil 
ri ghts organi zati on that was founded in 1963 by the leaders 
o f the American bar, at the request of President John F. 
Kennedy, in order to help defend the civil 1ights of 
minori ties and the poor. Its Board of T rustees present ly 
2 Some amici also serve constituencies tha t will be affec ted by the 
Court ' s dec isio n because Title VII is the mode l fo r other employment 
d iscrimination statutes. See, e. g., Lorilla rd \'. Pons. 4 34 U.S. 575, 584 
("th e prohi bitions o f th e [Age Discriminati on in Emp loyment Act] were 
derived in haec verba from T itle VII") ; see also, e. g., Acrey v. American 
Sheep Indus. Ass'n, 98 1 F.2d 1569, 1574-75 (10th Cir. 1992) (affi rm ing 
construc tive di scharge verdict for plain tiff under ADEA, and app lying 
same lega l ana lysis to Tit le VII and AD EA constructive d ischarge 
c la ims). 
3 
includes several past Presidents of the American Bar 
Association , past Attorneys General of the United States, law 
school deans and professors, and many of the nation 's 
leading lawyers. The Lawyers' Committee, through its 
Employment Discrimination Project, has been continually 
involved in cases before the Court involving the proper 
scope and coverage afforded to federal civil rights laws 
prohibiting employment di scrimination . The Lawyers ' 
Committee has handled cases involving both racial and 
sex ual harassment , including filing an amicus brief in 
Faragher v. Ciry of Boca Raton , 524 U.S. 775 (1998) . 
Pursuant to a continuing interest in the approp1iate scope of 
Title VII, and most recently, the Lawyers ' Committee filed 
briefs in Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2001); National 
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 1 (2001); 
and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. , 530 U.S. 
133 (2000). 
AARP is a nonparti san, nonprofit membership 
organization serving over thirty-five million persons age 50 
and older that is dedicated to addressing the needs and 
interests of older Americans. One of AARP's primary 
objectives is to achieve dignity and equality in the workplace 
through positive attitudes , practices , and policies towards 
work and retirement. Almost half of AARP members are 
employed, and all of these have a strong interest in the 
outcome of this case , which will affect their rights under the 
Age Di scrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), due to 
similariti es in judicial interpretation of comparable 
provisions of the ADEA and Title VII. In addition, more 
than half of AARP's working members are women , and a 
disproportionate share of them (and of AARP members of 
co lor, including African-American and Hispanic members) 
work fu ll - or part-time. Thus , AARP members have a strong 
interest in vigorous enforcement of Title VII with regard to 
sex ual (and rac ial) harassment. Finally, many AARP 
4 
members have disabilities , and rely on federal laws including 
the Americans with Disabilities Act - whose employment 
di scriminati on provisions also are based on Title VII - to 
create workplaces free from di scriminatory harassment. 
The Ameri can Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU ") is a 
nationwide, nonprofit, non -parti san organi zation of more 
than 400,000 members dedicated to the principles of li berty 
and equalit y embodied in the Constitution and thi s nation 's 
civil ri ghts laws. The ACLU Women 's Ri ghts Project 
("WRP"), founded in 1972 by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, has 
been a leader in the efforts to eliminate barriers to women' s 
full eq uality in American society. As part of th at work, the 
ACLU WRP has dedicated its eff01t s to ensuring women's 
equal treatment in the workplace through the vigorous 
enforcement of the protections of Title VII. The ACLU has 
appeared before the Court in numerous cases involving the 
proper interpretation of c ivil ri ghts laws and has fought to 
ensure that all indi viduals, regardless of race , gender, or 
other protected characteri stics, have equal opportuniti es in 
the workpl ace. The ACLU has pmticipated as amicus before 
the Court in several cases interpreting Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, inc luding Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 
U.S. 775 (1998). More recent Title VII cases in which the 
ACLU has appeared as amicus inc lude Desert Palace v. 
Costa , 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Pollard v. E. !. Dupont Nemou rs 
Co. , 532 U.S. 843 (200 1); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products. Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); and Kolstad v. 
American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526 (1999). 
The Legal Aid Society - Employment Law Center 
("LAS -ELC") is a non-profit public interest law firm whose 
mi ssion is to protect, preserve, and advance the workpl ace 
rights of individuals from traditionally under-represented 
communiti es. Since 1970, the LAS-ELC has represented 
plaintiffs in cases invo lvi ng the ri ghts of employees in the 
workplace, parti cularly th ose cases of special import to 
5 
communities of color, women, recent immigrants , 
individual s with di sabilities , and the working poor, and 
specializes in , among other areas of the law, sex 
discrimi nation and sexual harassment. 
The LAS-ELC has appeared before thi s Court on 
numerous occasions both as counsel for plaintiffs, see 
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 
(2002) ; U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Bametl, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); 
and Califomia Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra , 479 
U.S . 272 (1987) (counsel for real party in interest), as well as 
in an amicus curiae capacity. See, e.g., U.S. v. Virginia , 5 18 
U.S. 515 (1996) ; Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 
(1993); International Union, VA W v. Johnson Controls, 499 
U.S. 187 (1991); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S . 228 
(1989); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) . 
The LAS-ELC' s interest in preserving the protections 
afforded employees by thi s country's antidiscrimination laws 
is longstanding. 
The National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People ("NAACP") , establi shed in 1909, is the 
nation 's oldest ci vii ri ghts organization. The fundamental 
mi ssion of the NAACP is the advancement and improvement 
of the political , educational, social, and economic status of 
minority groups; the eli mination of prejudice ; the publicizing 
of adverse effects of di scrimination ; and the initiation of 
lawful action to secure the elimination of age , rac ial , 
religi ous, and ethnic bias . 
The National Asian Pacific American Legal 
Consort ium ("NAPALC") is a national non-profit, non -
partisan organization whose mission is to advance the legal 
and civil rights of Asian Pacific Americans. Col lectively, 
NAPALC and its Affiliates the Asian Law Caucus and the 
Asian Pacifi c American Legal Center of Southern California 
have over 50 years of experi ence in providing lega l, public 
6 
policy, advocacy, and community education on 
discrimination Issues. NAPALC and its Affiliates have a 
long-standing commitment in addressing matters of 
discrimination that have an impact on the Asian Pacific 
American community, and this interest has resulted in 
NAPALC's participation in a number of amicus briefs before 
the courts. 
The National Employment Lawyers Association 
("NELA") is the country's on ly professional membership 
organization of lawyers who regularly represent employees 
in labor, employment and civi l rights disputes. NELA and 
its 67 state and local affi liates have a membership of over 
3,000 attorneys, and NELA regularly supports precedent-
setting litigation affecting the rights of individuals in the 
workplace. NELA has fi led amicus curiae briefs before this 
Court and numerous courts of appeals regarding the proper 
interpretation and application of Title VII in order to 
guarantee that the rights of workers are full y protected. For 
example, NELA fi led amicus curiae briefs with this Court in 
Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Edelman v. 
Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106 (2002); and West v. 
Gibson, 527 U.S. 2 12 (1999). 
NELA members represent thousands of individuals in 
this country who are victims of unlawful sex discrimination , 
including sexual harassment. The interest of NELA in this 
case is to protect the rights of its members' clients, by 
ensuring that the goals of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, as amended, to eradicate employment discrimination 
are fully realized. 
The National Partnership for Women & Families 
("National Partnership") is a national advocacy organization 
that develops and promotes policies to help women achieve 
equal opportunity, quality health care, and economic security 
for themselves and their families. Since its foundin g in 
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1971 , the National Partnership (formerly the Women's Legal 
Defense Fund) has worked to advance equal employment 
opportunities by monitoring agencies' EEO enforcement, 
challenging employment discrimination in the courts , and 
leading efforts to promote employment policies such as the 
Family and Medical Leave Act and the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act. 
The National Women 's Law Center ("NWLC") is a 
non-profit legal advocacy organization dedicated to the 
advancement and protection of women's ri ghts and the 
corresponding elimination of sex discrimination from all 
facets of American life. Since 1972, NWLC has worked to 
secure equal opportunity in the workplace, including through 
the fuJI enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, as amended. NWLC has prepared or participated in 
several amicus briefs in Title VII cases, including Faragher 
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) , and Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund is a leading 
national non-profit civil rights organization that for over 
thirty years has used the power of the Jaw to define and 
defend women's rights . A major goal of NOW Legal 
Defense and Education Fund is the eliminat ion of barriers 
that deny women economic opportunity, such as sexual 
harassment. NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund has 
litigated cases to secure full enforcement of Jaws prohibiting 
sexual harassment, including Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton , 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Robinson v. Jacksonville 
Shipyards, Inc. , 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 199 1), and has 
fil ed briefs in this Court as amicus curiae on leading sexual 
harassment cases, including Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth , 524 U.S . 742 ( 1998), Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) , and Harris v. Forklift 
Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). NOW Legal Defense and 
Education Fund believes that employers must be liable when 
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supervisors engage in di sctiminatory harassment that results 
in constructive discharge. Accordingly, NOW Legal Defense 
and Education Fund stron gly supports affirming the decision 
of the Third Circuit below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is a constructive di scharge case. Nancy Suders 
did not choose to leave her job . She was forced to resign 
because a combination of workplace conditions gave her no 
other choice. 3 Such forced resignation is the hallmark of 
constructive di scharge. Thi s Court and al l of the federal 
circuit courts of appeals have recognized constructive 
di scharge claims, holding empl oyers liable for wrongfu l 
di scharge when intolerable work conditions force an 
employee to resign. 4 In Suders' case, harassment by her 
direct supervi sors5 laid the groundwork for conditions that 
ultimately became so unbearable th at she resigned to escape 
them. Other factors that placed her in thi s impossible 
situat ion included the ineffecti veness of procedures that 
should have remedied the harassment, along with events and 
conditions that contributed to Suders' reasonable belief that 
further efforts to resolve the matter internall y would be 
futi le. 
In Faragher v. Cirv of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 
3 All reasonable infere nces must be drawn in favor of Suders, the party 
opposing the moti on for summary JUd gment. Burlington Indus. v. 
Ellerr!t . 524 U.S. 742. 747 ( 1998). ciTing UniTed Sta les 1·. Diebold, In c .. 
369 U.S. 654. 655 ( 1962). At thi s stage in the proceedings. Suders' 
testimony that she had no choice in thi s matte r must be taken as true. 
Ultimate ly. thi s question wo uld be put to the fact-finder. 
4 See infra argument I. 
5 Because the Court granted certiorari o n the question of a constructive 
di scharge caused by supervisors ' ac tio ns, rather th an coworkers' act ions, 
and because the fac ts of thi s case in vo lve supervisor harass ment, thi s 
brief does not address the iss ue of a constructive di scharge caused by 
coworker harassment. 
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(1998) , and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 
742 (1998) , thi s Court crafted a methodology for deciding 
harassment cases. That methodology di stinguishes between 
(1) hostil e work environment cases with no tangible 
employment action, in which defendants may in voke an 
affirmati ve defense, and (2) tangible employment action 
cases, m which no defense IS available. Under 
Faragher!Ellerth, employers are strictly liable if a 
supervisor's harassment of a subordinate culminates in a 
tangible employment action. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. The Court described "tangible 
employment action" as a "significant change in employment 
status" and provided a non-exhausti ve li st of examples, "such 
as hiring, firing , failing to promote, reassignment with 
significantl y different responsibilities, or a decision causing 
a signifi cant change in benefits. " Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790, 
808 ; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-62. 
Because courts have for decades recognized that a 
constructi ve di scharge-when proven-is the legal 
equivalent of an ac tual di scharge, and because 
Faragher/Ellerth defined "tangible employment actions" to 
include di scharges, constructive di scharges necessaril y 
constitute tangible employment actions . As a tangible 
employment action , constructive discharge precludes 
in voki ng the affirmative defense that Faragher/Ellerth made 
avail able in hostile environment cases. This conclusion is 
req uired by the Faragher/Ellerth description of tan gi ble 
employment ac tion as "a signi ficant change in employment 
status, " with all th at change entai ls. The conclusion is 
rendered inescapable by the reali ty that proof of the facts 
underlying a successfu l constructive di scharge claim, as a 
practical matter, di sproves the facts that would necessaril y 
underli e the affirmative defense. 
The State Poli ce and its amici ignore the doctrine of 
constructi ve di scharge that is at the core of th is case . In their 
10 
view, the fact that Suders was forced to leave her job 
because of her supervi sors' actions should not even facror 
into the li ability equation. Describing what happened to 
Suders as "mere" hostile work environment harassment, 
Petitioner asks the Court to absolve the employer of 
responsibility for "[t]he fact that an employee feels 
compelled to quit hi s or her job in response to intolerable 
sexual harassment." Brief for Petitioner at 12. From thi s 
truncated analysis of the facts, Petitioner then argues that it 
should be permitted to in voke th e Faragher/Ellerth 
affirmative defense . Petitioner's disaggregation of the facts 
directly contravenes the Court's mandate to consider the 
totality of circumstances in harass ment cases. Meritor 
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson. 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. When Proven, a Constructive Discharge is the 
Legal Equivalent of an Actual Discharge, Which 
F aragher/Ellerth Defined as a Tangible 
Employment Action. 
For decades, courts have recognized that a 
constructive discharge-when proven-is the legal 
equivalent of an actual di scharge. The Faragher/Ellerth 
Court expressly cited actual di scharge as an example of a 
tangible employment action.6 Because di scharges fall 
squarely within the tangible employment action category, 
and because constructive discharge operates as the legal 
eq ui valent of ac tual di scharge, constructive di scharge 
necessaril y constitutes a tangible employment ac ti on.7 In 
6 The Courr prov ided a non-exhaustive li st of examples of tangible 
employment act ions, which included "hiring, firin g, fai ling to promote. 
reass ignment with s ignificantly different responsibilities, or a decision 
causing a significant change in benefits ." Faragher, 524 U.S . at 790; 
Ellerth, 524 U.S . at 76 1. 
7 See Suders v. Easton. 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003); Jaros v. LodgeNer 
Emm 'r Corp .. 294 F.3d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 2002) (constructive discharge 
consti tutes a tangible e mployment action); Durham Life In s. Co. v. 
Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 144 (3d C ir. 1999). The F irst and Seventh Circuits 
have held that a constructive di scharge caused by a supervi sor's "official 
act" is a tangible employme nt action. Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc .. 
333 F.3d 27, 33 ( 1st Cir. 2003) (constructive discharge is a tangible 
employment act ion if it is caused by a supervisor's "offic ial" act); accord 
Robinson v. Sappington. 35 1 F.3d 3 17. 336 (7th Cir. 2003). A signi ficant 
number of federal di strict courts have ruled that constructive di scharge is 
a tangible employment ac ti on. Vasquez v. Atrium Door & Window Co. 
of A ri::.., Inc., 2 18 F. Supp. 2d 11 39, 1142 (D. Ariz. 2002); Rousselle v. 
GTE Direcrories C01p .. 85 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1292 (M.D. F la. 2000); 
Bevilacqua \'. Cubby Bear, Ltd. , No. 98 C 7568, 2000 WL 1521 35, at *22 
(N.D . Ill. Feb. 4, 2000); Cherry v. Menard. Inc. , 101 F. Supp . 2d 11 60 
(N.D. Iowa 2000); Watsoll v. Lucenr Techs., 92 F. Supp. 2d 11 29. 11 35 
(D Kan. 2000); Price v. Delaware Dep 'r of Correcrions. 40 F. Supp . 2d 
544. 553 (D. Del. 1999); Limz v. Am. Gen Fin, Inc. , 50 F. Supp. 2d 
1074. I 084 rD . Kan. 1999); Galloway \'. Matagorda Counry, Tex., 35 F. 
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liti gation , the Equal Employment Opp011unity Commission 
("EEOC"), the federa l agency charged with enforcing Title 
VII , has also taken the position that a constructi ve di scharge 
is a tangible employment action8 EEOC interpretive 
guidance issued after Faragher!Ellerth provides: 
Liability standards under the anti-
di scrimination statutes .. . generally make 
employers responsible for the di scriminatory 
acts of their supervisors. If for example , a 
supervisor rejects a candidate for promotjon 
because of nationa l origin -based bias, the 
employer will be li able regardless of 
Supp. 2d 952.957 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ; Leslie v. Unired Tech. Co rp .. 5 1 F. 
Supp. 2d 1332. 1345-46 (S .D. Fla. 1998); Mill er v. D.F. Zee's, Inc., 31 F. 
Supp. 2d 792, 803-04 (D . Or. 1998); Dela -:;aro v. Lehigh Univ., No. 98-
CV432. 1999 U.S Dist. LEXIS 12 14. at *479 (E. D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1999); 
Jones , .. USA Perrolettllt Corp ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379, J 383 (S .D. Ga. 
J 998). The Second and E leventh Circui ts have held that constructi ve 
di scharge is not a tangible emp loyment ac ti on. and therefore. employers 
may assert the Ellerrh!Faragher affirm ati ve defe nse. Ca ridad v. Merro-
Norch Commwer R.R ., 19 1 F. 3d 283. 294 (2d Cir. 1999) accord Reynolds 
v. Golden Co rral Corp .. 106 F. Supp. 2d 1243. 1249 (M.D Ala. 1999), 
aff'd 2 13 F3d 1344 !11th Cir. 2000) (pe r cu riam); see also Desmarreau 
, .. Ciry of Wichi ta, Kan .. 64 F. Supp . 2d 1067, 1078 !D. Kan. 1999) ; 
Dunegan ,., Ciry of Council Grove. Kan. Warer Dep 't. 77 F. S upp . 2d 
11 92, 1200 (D. Kan. 1999) ; Scorr v. Amerirex Yarn , 72 F. Supp . 2d 587, 
594 (O .S.C. 1999); Albener v. McDonald's Corp. , 70 F. Supp . 2d 11 38. 
1147 !D Nev. 1999); Powell v. Morris. 37 F. Supp. 2d 1011. 10 19 !S.D. 
O hi o 1999). 
8 See Brie f for EEOC at 3. EEOC v. Cro1vc/er Consnucrion Co., No. 
3:00CV I86-V, 200 1 WL 1750843 (W .DNC. Oct. 26, 2001 ) 
!" IC]onstructi ve di scharge constitutes a tangib le job ac tion because it 
results in a 'significant ' change in employment tatus."); accord Ame nded 
Memorandum in Sup port o f EEOC's Opposition to Motio n for Summary 
Judgment at 15- 19, EEOC v. Barron ProtecTi ve Services, Inc ., 47 F. 
Supp . 2d 57 (D.D .C. 1999) !No. 98- 1536/JR) (" Defendant, while 
recogni zing EEOC's a llegati on that '( the plai ntiff] was constructi vely 
discharged' . obtuse ly maintains that she did not suffe r a 'tangible 
employment ac ti on' . . Not surprisingly. courts have recogni zed that 
constructi ve d ischarge can be a tangible employment ac ti on.") . 
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whether the employee complained to higher 
management and regardless of whether 
higher management had any knowledge 
about the supervisor's motivation. 
Harassment is the only type of 
discrimination carried out by a supervi sor 
for which an employer can avoid liability 
and that limitation must be construed 
narrowl y. 
EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer 
Responsibility for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors , 
Part (V)(B) (June 18, 1999). Indeed, an employer should 
not be able to avoid liability where an employee has no 
reasonable option but to resign . 
Courts and federal enforcement agencies have 
consistent] y treated constructive di scharge as actual 
di scharge. In fact , the doctrine developed preci sely for the 
purpose of holding employers responsible for unlawful 
conditi ons that force employees to resign. The Supreme 
Court first held that a constructive discharge function s as the 
legal equivalent of an actual di scharge in the case of Sure-
Tan, Inc. v. NLRB , 467 U.S. 883 , 894 (1984)_9 In that 
National Labor Relations Act case, the Court express ly 
recognized the equi valence between directly di smissing an 
employee and creating "working conditions so intolerable 
that the employee has no option but to resign -- a so-called 
'constructive di scharge ."' !d. The Court' s Sure-Tan decision 
continued a tradition under the National Labor Relations Act, 
29 U.S.C. 151 el seq. , of recognizing constructive di scharge 
as the legal equivalent of actual di scharge. See Th e 
9 See also Ruran v. Republican Parry of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 , 68, 76 
( 1990) (First Amendment pat ronage case recogni zing that constructi ve 
di scharge is the "substantia l equivalent of a dismissa l," expla ining that 
"an employment deci sion is eq uivalent to a dismissal when it is one that" 
would lead a reasonable person to resign" ). 
14 
Coachman's Inn , 147 NLRB 278, 303 (1964) (" 
'[R]esignati on,' under pressure and scare . . . [must be] 
treated fo r legal purposes the same as an actual di scharge . . . 
. ") ; In Matter of Sterling Corset Co., 9 N .L.R.B. 858 (1938) 
(first use of the term "constructive di scharge"). 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S .C. 
2000e et seq. , which was modeled on the NLRA, adopted the 
doctrine of constructive di scharge in whole cloth. See, e.g., 
110 CONG. REC. 3086, 7210-11 , 8453 (1964) (Titl e VII 
was patterned after labor laws including NLRA); English v. 
Powell 592 F.2d 727 , 73 1 n.4 (4th C ir. 1979) (holding 
"doctrine of constructive di scharge 'had its genesis in the 
labor relations area but has been extended and held 
appli cable to civil rights claims' "). Today, constructive 
di scharge is universall y recogni zed to provide redress to 
employees who are forced out of employment through 
di scriminatory means.1° Consistent with thi s uni versall y 
accepted principle , the EEOC explains that an employer "i s 
responsible for a constructive di scharge in the same manner 
that it is responsible for the outri ght di scriminatory discharge 
of a chargi ng party." EEOC Interpretive Manual , § 
6 12.9(a). 11 
1° Firz v. Pugmire Lincoln -Mercury. Inc., 348 F. 3d 974, 977 ( 11th Cir. 
2003); Goldmeier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 629. 635 (6th Ci r. 2003); 
EEOC v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps , 276 F. 3d 326, 33 1 (7 th C ir. 2002); 
Fi1zgera/d v. Henderson, 25 1 F.3d 345, 357-58 (2d Cir. 2001); Jordan v. 
Clark, 847 F.2d 1368. 1377 n.l O (9th C ir. 1988); Sheridan v. E. !. DuPo111 
de Nemorm & Co ., 100 F.3d 106 1, 1075 (3d Cir. 1996); Vega v. Kodak 
Ca ribbean. Ltd., 3 F.3d 476 (1st C ir. 1993); Landgraf v. US/ Film 
Prods., 968 F.2d 427 ,430 (5 th Cir. 1992); Parolin e v. Unisys C01p. , 900 
F.2d 27 (4 th Cir. 1990); Wwson v. Natio nwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360 
(9th Ci r. 1987) ; Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340 ClOth Cir. 1986) ; 
Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 198 1 ); see also A. 
Larson & L. Larson, EMPLOYMENT D ISCRIMINATION, § 87 .20 at 17-102 
to 17-105 ( 1987). 
11 Indeed, contrary to the heav il y conditi oned position articu lated in the 
Solic itor General's bri ef, to which the EEOC is a s ignatory, the EEOC 
has taken the straightforward position in its liti gation that a constructi ve 
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Appropriately, in Suders, the Third Circuit 
recogni zed that a constructi ve discharge is the equi valent of 
an ac tual di scharge: 
[It is a] fundamental principle of our 
jurisprudence that a constructive di scharge, 
when proved, operates as the functional 
equi valent of an ac tual termination. Thi s 
p1inciple recogni zes that when a plaintiff-
employee successfully demonstrates that the 
work environment created by an employer 
was so intolerable that he or she had no 
choice but to resign, the constructi ve 
di scharge becomes, for all intents and 
purposes, the ac t of the employer. 
Suders, 325 F.3d at 458 (c itations omitted) .12 
di scharge is necessaril y a tangible employment action and categori zed 
the arguments to the contrary as "obtuse. " See supra note 8. 
12 See also, e.g. , Fitz v. Pugmire Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 348 F.3d 974, 
977 (1 1th Cir. 2003) ("[C]onstructive discharge occurs when a 
di criminatory e mployer imposes working conditions that are 'so 
into lerable that a reasonab le person in [the employee's] position would 
have been compelled to resign.' "); Manau v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F. 3d 
792, 803 (9th C ir . 2003) (constructi ve d ischarge requires "conditions so 
into lerab le that a reasonable person would leave the job"); Goldmeier v. 
A llsrare In s. Co. , 337 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2003) (employer must 
create intolerable working conditions that would force a reasonable 
person to res ign); Suarez v. Pu eblo Inr'l, Inc., 229 F. 3d 49, 54 (1st C ir . 
2000) (finding constructive di scharge where "the working conditions 
imposed by the employer had become so onerous, abusive, or unpleasant 
that a reasonable person in the e mployee ·s position would have fe lt 
compelled to res ign" ); Kirsch v. Fleer Srreer, Lrd., 148 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 
1 998) (working conditions must be so intolerable that employee is forced 
into invo luntary res ignation); Brown v. Amerirech C01p., 128 F.3d 605 
{7 th Cir. 1997) (rejecting claim of constructi ve discharge on the grounds 
that employee coul d have remai ned and the supervisor's comment was 
insufficientl y fo rceful or coercive); Landg raf v. US! Film Prods., 968 
F.2d 427. 430 (5 th Cir. I 992) (find ing constructi ve di scharge where the 
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In contrast to a constructive discharge claim, a hostile 
work environment claim does not require proof of conditions 
that would force a reasonable person to resign. Instead, a 
c laim of environmental harassment requires proof of 
di scri minatory behavior that ts sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to alter the conditions of a victim's employment 
and to create an abusive working environment. Meriwr 
Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 64 , 67. The Supreme Court has 
c larified that the hostile work environment "standard takes a 
middle path between making actionable any conduct that is 
merely offensive and req uiring the conduct to cause a 
tangible psychological injury . .. . Title VII comes into play 
before the harassin g conduct leads to a nervous breakdown." 
Harris v. Forklift Sys., In c., 510 U.S. 17 , 21-22 (1993) . The 
doctrine of constructi ve di scharge applies in the most 
egregious cases in whi ch the employee is forced to resign 
because the work environment has become patently 
intolerable, and a reasonable person would conclude that he 
or she has no real option but to resign. 13 
plaintiff demonstrates "a greater seve rity or pervasiveness of harassment 
than the minimum req uired to prove a hostile work ing environment" ); 
Amimwkri v. Balrimore Gas & Elec. Co .. 60 F.3d 1126. 11 32 (4th Cir. 
1995) (co nstructi ve di scharge requires proof that employer de liberate ly 
made working conditi ons intolerable in an effort to induce the employee 
to quit); Wesr v. Marion Merrell Dow, In c., 54 F. 3d 493. 497 (8th Cir. 
1995) ("An employee is constructi vely di scharged when an employer 
de libe rate ly renders the employee's working conditi ons into lerable and 
thus fo rces [her] to quit [her] job."); Clark r. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 
m.c. C ir . 198 1) (employee must estab li sh that the employer 
"deliberate ly made workin g conditi ons inte lora ble and drove [the 
employee] into an 'invo luntary quit.'" ; Carrwright Hardware Co ., In c. 1'. 
NLRB, 600 F.2d 268 ( lOth Cir. 1979) (rejecting claim of constructi ve 
di scharge because record did not establish th at the employees resigned 
because employer had created "impossible" conditions) . 
13 This in no way suggests that the degree of harassment is the defining 
fac to r in a construc ti ve discharge case. The standard fo r constructive 
discharge is that the employee is fo rced to resign because the work 
envi ro nment has become so intolerable. and a reasonable person would 
conclude that they have no rea l option but to res ign. See supra note 12. 
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If Suders prevail s on her claim of constructive 
discharge , that discharge constitutes a tangible employment 
action for which the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense is 
unavailable. Although Suders has not yet had the 
opportunity to present her claim of constructive discharge to 
a fact-finder, the Third Circuit suggests that her employment 
situati on had reached a breaking point. Suders, 325 F.3d at 
438 ("Suders reached a breaking point .... Any prospect of 
reconciliation was now lost. "). At thi s point in the 
proceedings, we must take as true Suders' allegations that the 
hostile environment, combined with the lack of recourse, 
fo rced her resignation . If these facts are accepted by the 
fact -finder , Suders will prevail on her claim of constructive 
di scharge . 
If a fact-finder concludes that a constructive 
di scharge occurred, thi s case cannot be characterized as 
Petitioner suggests-as a "mere" hostile work environment 
to whi ch Suders responded by choosing to quit. Brief for 
Petitioner at 12. In a constructive di scharge case, the 
employee does not "choose" to resign. Instead, workplace 
conditi ons leave the employee with no option but to leave. 
B y definition , such a constructive di scharge is the act of the 
employer, not of the terminated worker. Because a 
constructive di scharge is the legal equi valent of an actual 
di scharge, a constructive di scharge constitutes a tangible 
empl oyment action . 
II. When Proven, Constructive Discharge Addresses 
the Core Policy Considerations Underlying the 
Faragher!Ellerth Defense, and Permitting the 
Defense in a Constructive Discharge Situation 
Makes No Sense. 
The Supreme Court's purpose in allowing the 
Faragher!Ellerth defense is accompli shed at the outset if the 
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plaintiff proves the elements of a constructive discharge. If 
employment circumstances are so onerous, abusive, or 
unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's 
position is compel led to resign , 14 then it wi ll be impossible 
for the employer to prove that the employee acted 
unreasonably under the Faragher/Ellerth defense . Proof of 
a constructive di scharge and proof of the Faragher/Ellerth 
defense are mutually exc lusive and cannot be established on 
the same factu al base. 
The Faragher/Ellerth defense allows an employer to 
avoid liability when the employer exercised reasonable care 
to prevent and promptl y correct any sexually harassing 
behavior, and th e plaintiff-employee unreasonably fai led to 
take advantage of any preventative or corrective 
opportuniti es provided by the employer. Faragher, 524 U.S. 
at 807. Before a jury wou ld reach the question of whether 
the employee acted unreasonab ly under the affi1mative 
defense, however, th e jury would have first had to find a 
constructive di scharge- i. e., that working conditions were so 
difficu lt or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the 
employee's shoes would have fe lt compelled to resign. See 
supra note 12. These two findings cannot exist in tandem. 
The employer cannot prove the second prong of the 
affirmative defense-that the employee acted 
unreasonab ly- if the plaintiff proves at the outset that she 
acted reasonably pursuant to her constructive di scharge 
claim. 
A plaintiff alleging a constructive di scharge in 
violation of Tit le VII must establi sh that he or she suffered 
harassment or di scrimination so intolerab le that a reasonable 
person in the same position wou ld have felt compelled to 
resign, given the totality of the circumstances. See supra 
note 12. In every juri sdiction , a claim of constructive 
14 See supra note 1:2. 
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di scharge requires proof that the employee reasonably 
believed that she had no recourse but to resign . !d. As the 
Third Circuit observed in thi s case , "it is relevant whether the 
employee explored alternative avenues to resolve the all eged 
discrimination before resigning, [but] a failure to do so will 
not defeat a claim of constructive discharge where the 
working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable 
person would have concluded that there was no other choice 
but to resign ."15 Suders , 325 F.3d at 445-46 (emphasis 
added). In sum, if there is an avenue short of resignation 
reasonably available to the employee to remedy the 
situation , and she fail s to pursue that avenue, her fai lure wi ll 
defeat the constructive di scharge claim. 
Petitioner and the Solicitor General have 
acknowledged the overlap between elements of constructive 
di scharge and of the Faragher/Ellerth defense. Brief for 
Petitioner at 11: Brief for Soli citor General at 17-18. The 
Soli citor General admits th at "[i]f an employer makes the 
showing necessary to establi sh the Ellerrh/Faragher 
affirmative defense, it is difficult to understand how an 
empl oyee would be able to es tabli sh a constructive di scharge 
in the first place ." Bri ef for Solicitor General at 17-18. 
Although the briefs of the Petitioner and its amici admi t thi s 
overlap , they fail to address its ramifications. The Solicitor 
General 's brief suggests that the instant "case does not raise 
the question of the precise relationship between the standard 
fo r provmg a constructive di scharge and th e 
15 The Chamber of Commerce argues that harass ment victims will 
de liberate ly deprive employers of info rm at ion about harass ment so that 
victims can bring co nstructi ve di scharge cases and cut off any affirmative 
de fe nses by qui uin g rather than notify ing the employer, who co uld then 
correc t the harass ment. Thi s argument ignores the fac t that the plaintiff 
who man ipulates the system in thi s way would not be able to meet the 
"reasonableness" tes t req uired to prove a constructive di scharge . It al so 
igno res the fac ts that res igning from a j ob is not easy for an employee 
who is dependent on a sa lary. and that bringing a harass ment case is a 
stress ful. expensive undertaking. 
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Ellerth/Faragher affirm ative defense ." 16 /d. On the 
contrary, thi s case raises precisely that issue. Thi s case 
cannot be decided without accounting for the mutual 
exclusivity of the doctrines of constructi ve dj scharge and the 
Faragher/Ellerth affirm ati ve defense. The Court should 
address thi s concern and provide a coherent doctrine to guide 
the lower courts, recogni zing that a constructi ve di scharge 
occurs when into lerable employment circumstances leave an 
employee wi th no option but to resign. When a constructi ve 
di scharge occurs, the affirm ati ve defense has no applicati on. 
III. Constructive Discharge Exhibits the Attributes of 
a Tangible Employment Action 
In Faragher/Ellerth , the Court noted attributes 
typical of tan gible employment ac tions. Generall y, the Court 
explaj ned th at a tangible employment ac tion may 
fundamental! y change the worker's status at the firm , impose 
direct fin ancial harm, and constitute an offi cia l compan y 
ac t. 17 Under the Court's reasoning, these attributes veri fy 
that the ac ti on is aided by the agency relati onship .18 The 
16 B y its own admiss ion. the Solic itor General's pro posed analys is could 
onl y app ly to a narrow e t o f c ircumstances where the evidence 
supporting the constructive d ischarge does no t overl ap with the 
affirmati ve defense . Brief for Soli c ito r Genera l at 17- 18. 
17 T hese are examples of the attr ibutes o f a tangib le employment ac ti on. 
rather th an an exc lus ive or mandatory lis t. The to ta li ty o f fac ts must be 
examined in each harass ment case. Meriro r Sa vings Bank. FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U .S. 57, 69 ( 1986); see also Holly D. v. Ca. fnsr. of Tech .. 
339 F.3d 11 58 (9 th Cir . 2003) (submissio n to sex ual abuse by a 
supervisor constitutes a tangible employme nt ac tion); l in v. Merro. Life 
In s Co., 3 10 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2002) (same) . 
18 In Faragher, the Court recogni zed : 
[T]here is a sense in which a harass ing supervisor is 
a lways ass isted in his mi sconduct by the supervisory 
re lationshi p W hen a person with superv isory 
authority d iscrim inates in the terms and cond itions of 
subord inates ' employment, hi s ac tio ns necessaril y 
d raw upon his supe rio r pos ition o ver the people who 
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Court discussed these attributes m general terms and used 
qualifying language: 
A tangible employment action in most cases 
inflicts direct economic harm. As a general 
proposition, only a supervisor, or other 
person acting with the authority of the 
company can cause this sort of injury .... A 
tangible employment decision ... in most 
cases is documented in official company 
records . .. . 
Ellenh, 524 U.S. at 761-62 (emphasis added). Clearly the 
Court intended to provide a flexible framework of general 
guidance. The Cour1 did not suggest that each of these 
attributes would apply to every tangible employment action. 
Nevertheless, a constructive discharge possesses each of the 
attributes characte ri sti c of the tangible employment action , 
as described in Faragher/Ellerth. 
Ellerth characterized a "tangible employment action" 
as "a significant change in employment status .... " Ellerth, 
524 U.S. at 761. In its effect on the worker's employment 
status, a constructive discharge is unassai labl y a discharge 
with identical changes in employment status. "[C]onstructive 
report to him, o r those under them, whereas an 
employee generall y cannot check a supervisor"s 
abusive conduct the same way that she mi ght deal 
with abuse from a coworker. 
Faragher. 524 U.S . at 802-03. Accordingly, an employer can be li ab le 
for the act ions o f a supervisor, even when the supervi sor acts outside o f 
express ly and affirmatively de legated authority. Faragher at 805; see 
also Susan Grover. After E llerth: Th e Tangible Employment Action in 
Sexual Harassmem Analysis. 35 U. MICH. J.L. R EFORM 809, 839 (2002) 
("The key. then , is ... the source of the power the supervisor uses to take 
that ac tion. If that power is derived from the authority the supervi sor 
derives from hi s relat ionship with the employer, the ac ti on taken is a 
[tangible employment act ion). regardless of whether it alters the 
subordinate 's status in an ultimate sense." ). 
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di scharge constitutes prec isely the same sort of 'significant 
change in employment status' and inflicts prec isely the same 
sort of 'economi c harm' as any other 'firing.' " Cherry v. 
Menard, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1173 (N.D. Iowa 2000); 
see also Vasquez v. Atrium Door & Window Co. of Ariz., 
Inc ., 218 F. Supp. 2d 11 39, 1142-43 (D. Ariz. 2002) . 
Petitioner actuall y agrees that constructive discharge 
"effects a signifi cant change in employment status, " but 
would di scount that change by claiming that the change is "a 
result of the employee ' s own dec ision." Brief for Petitioner 
at 21. This argument has two shortcomings. For one , the 
change in employment status results regardl ess of whether 
the di scharge is ac tual or constructive. The "significant 
change in empl oyment status" cri terion of Faragher/Ellerrh 
assesses the results of the act, not the causative act itself. 
More importantly, Petitioner's characteii zati on of the 
underlying act is inaccurate ; the causative act is not that of 
the employee, but of the employer, through the ac tions of its 
supervi sors combined with the unavai labili ty of internal 
remedi es to rectify the situation. B y definiti on. constructive 
di scharge does not involve a true choice on th e pan of the 
employee. When a constructi ve di scharge occurs, the 
responsible actor is the employer, not the emp loyee. The 
discharge is forced on the employee by the employer's 
ac ti ons-the employee has no choice but to resign. As a 
matter o f law, a constructive discharge is identi cal to an 
actual di scharge in its effect on the empl oyee 's employment 
status. 
The Court also provided that a "tangible empl oyment 
action in most cases infli cts direc t economic harm ." Ellerth, 
524 U.S. at 762 . Like any other type of discharge, 
constructive di scharge falls squarely within the category of 
e mployment actions that cause economic harm. As the Third 
Ci rcuit recogni zed in thi s case, "when a plaintiff-empl oyee 
meets the strin gent test of showing a constructive di scharge, 
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the direct economic harm suffered is identical to that of a 
formally di scharged employee." Suders, 325 F.3d at 458. 
Because direct economic harm results regardless of whether 
the di scharge is actual or constructive , Ellerth's definition 
renders constructive discharge a tangible employment action. 
The Court also advi sed that a tangible employment 
action in most cases involves an "official company act." 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762. Where intolerable work conditions 
force an employee to resign , that constructive di scharge is 
treated as an act of the employer, just as an actual di scharge 
would be. The official nature of the di scharge is reinforced 
by the employer's receipt , acceptance, processing and 
recording of the employee's letter or other notice of 
resignabon . As found by the court below , "when a 
superv isor creates a hostile work environment so severe th at 
an employee has no alternative but to resign , the official 
power of the enterprise is brought to bear on the constructive 
di scharge. " Suders, 325 F.3d at 459. The official action is 
allowing the workplace to become so hostile and so 
unresponsive to the employee's injuries that the harassed 
employee reasonabl y believes that immediate resignation is 
her on! y choice. For decades, the law has recogni zed that a 
constructi ve discharge is an official company act for which 
the employer must be liable. See supra argument I. Under 
the doctrine of constructive discharge, the official ac t is the 
creation of workplace conditions so intolerable that the 
harassed employee has no choice but to resign. 
Because a constructive discharge constitutes an 
offici al act in and of itself, the Court must reject the Solicitor 
General's argument that a constructi ve di scharge constitutes 
a tangible employment action onl y if it is effected through an 
intermediate "official ac t." Brief for Solicitor General at 8. 
Moreover, the di stinction between official and unofficial acts 
suggested by the Solicitor General ignores the reality of the 
workpl ace. The Court has recognized th at "a supervisor's 
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power and authority invests hi s or her harassing conduct with 
a particular threatening charac ter, and in thi s sense, a 
supervisor always is aided by the agency relation ." Ellerth , 
524 U.S . at 763. Where, as here, a supervisor's actions 
culminate in a di scharge, the Court recognized in Ellerth that 
those actions are aided by the agency relation . Ellerth, 524 
U.S. at 761. 
Additionall y, the Court ex plained that an official 
company act "in most cases is documented in official 
company records, and may be subject to review by hi gher 
level supervi sors." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762. Indeed, a 
constructive di scharge invol ves a forced resignation that will 
be documented in company records and subject to revi ew by 
hi gher level supervi sors. The compan y must take official 
actions to ensure that the person is no longer on the payroll. 
The Th ird Circuit recognized that "a constructive discharge 
will necessarily in volve the termination of an employment 
relationship , [therefore] the employer wi ll be on notice and 
have the opportunity to determine the cause of separation 
from employment." Suders. 325 F. 3d at 460. The added 
element of a forced res ignation distinguishes constructive 
di scharge from a hostile environment, where there is no 
official company act. 
In summary, Faragher/Ellerth created an exception 
to the general rule of employer li ability. Thi s exception 
app li es on ly to claims of hostile work environment. The 
exception does not appl y to tan gible employment actions, 
such as the constructive di scharge that occurred in thi s case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the amici respectfull y suggest 
25 
that the Third Circuit's holding that constructive discharge 
constitutes a tangible employment action, and therefore, the 
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